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Abstract
The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development 
issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the 
names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those 
of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and 
its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent.
Policy ReseaRch WoRking PaPeR 4863
This paper provides an overview of the fiscal problems 
faced by five urban agglomerations in India, namely, 
Delhi, Hyderabad, Kolkata, Chennai, and Pune. It 
analyzes the fiscal health of the five urban agglomerations, 
quantifies their revenue capacities and expenditure 
needs, and draws policy recommendations on the means 
to reduce the gaps between revenue raising capacities 
and expenditure needs. The main findings suggest that, 
except for five small urban local bodies in Hyderabad, 
the others are not in a position to cover their expenditure 
needs by their present revenue collections. All the urban 
agglomerations have unutilized potential for revenue 
generation; however, with the exception of Hyderabad, 
they would fail to cover their expenditure needs even if 
they realized their revenue potential. Except in Chennai, 
larger corporations are more constrained than smaller 
urban local bodies. 
This paper—a product of the Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Division, World Bank Institute—is part of 
a larger effort in the department to reform fiscal management for better governance. Policy Research Working Papers are 
also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The author may be contacted at simantib@nipfp.org.in.  
The paper recommends better utilization of “own 
revenue” through improved administration of property 
taxes, implementation of other taxes, and collection 
of user charges. It recommends that state governments 
should explore the option of allowing local bodies to 
piggyback a small proportion on their value-added tax 
collections. Another way to reduce the fiscal gap would 
be to earmark a portion of the sales proceeds from 
land and housing by state governments sold through 
their development agencies for improvements in urban 
infrastructure. The paper also recommends that the 
State Finance Commissions should develop appropriate 
norms for estimating expenditure needs, based on which 
transfers from the state to local governments can be 
decided. 
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1. Introduction 
Perhaps, no other area of analysis and policy has received as much focus and yet 
continues to be in a poor state, as the provision of urban infrastructure and services.  The 
rapid pace of urbanization has placed heavy demands on infrastructure and services while 
faulty planning and frequent changes to suit political needs, implementation, governance 
issues, obsolete laws, ill conceived policies and low capacity of institutions have led to a poor 
state of infrastructure and service delivery. Indeed the problem is complex and multi-
dimensional, and the solution requires reforms in both policies and institutions. 
Financing urban infrastructure and services will be the most formidable challenge in 
the coming years. Presently there are over 330 million people living in urban areas distributed 
over 5,165 cities in India. Urban population is growing at 2.7 percent and the growth rate is 
likely to accelerate to 3 percent in the next few years.   Agriculture contributes to just about 
18 percent of the GDP, but over 65 percent of the population resides in rural areas.  With the 
passage of time, the population will gravitate towards urban agglomerations in search of 
livelihood opportunities.  As economic activities, particularly in the manufacturing and 
service sectors increase, the transaction cost of mobility will decline and the rate of migration 
will increase. At present there are 35 cities with more than 1 million population and it is 
estimated that the urban sector presently contributes to about 62-63 percent of GDP and this 
is likely to increase to 75 percent by 2021 (GOI, 2008).  
While the demand for infrastructure and the financial requirements for providing the 
required minimum services are large and growing, the resources actually available can meet 
only a fraction of the requirements. Even going by the norms specified by the Zakaria 
Committee, which was determined in the 1960s, a recent study for the period 1999-2000 to 
2003-04 shows that in 30 municipal corporations in India, on an average, actual spending is 
only about 24 percent of the requirements, or the extent of under-spending is as high as 76 
percent (Mohanty et.al, 2007). The study also shows that of the 30 municipal corporations, 
the extent of under-spending was over 75 percent in 17 municipal corporations, and over 50 
percent in all of them except in three which are Pune (31.6 percent), Nagpur (30.8 percent) 
and Nasik (35.5 percent). In fact, the Patna Municipal Corporation actually spends only about 
5.6 percent of the requirement and the shortfall was 90 percent in almost all municipal 
corporations in UP and Bihar, even going by the norms specified over 45 years ago. 
 
 
3
 By any reckoning, the infrastructure deficit in urban areas is large and growing. The 
analysis shows that 34 percent of the urban households do not have water taps within their 
premises, 26 percent of them do not have toilets, 70 percent of waste is not treated before 
disposal, 21 percent of the urban population lives in squatter settlements, and untreated 
sewerage and unregulated discharge from industries is a major source of pollution of water 
bodies in the country. According to the draft Eleventh Five year Plan document, only 63 
percent of urban population had access to sewerage and sanitation facilities in 2004.  Problem 
of urban transportation is acute; public transportation is congested and inefficient and those 
who can afford private transportation can travel a kilometer distance in 15 minutes on an 
average due to road congestion. There are severe problems of housing as well, and as 
mentioned earlier, almost 21 percent of the people live in squatter settlements. 
 Comprehensive assessment of the investment requirements for provision of adequate 
urban infrastructure is not available. Most assessments simply apply the Zakaria Committee 
norms adjusted to increases in prices to arrive at investment requirements. In the past, the 
government was not able to make even the planned level of investments and this has only 
contributed to infrastructure deficit. During the Tenth Plan period, i.e. 2002-07, for example, 
the projected requirements for 100 percent coverage of urban population with potable water 
supply and 75 percent of urban population with sewerage was estimated at Rs 537.19 billion. 
However, the funds actually made available for spending is estimated at Rs 358 billion. As 
mentioned earlier, the under-spending on public services in the municipal corporations taken 
together worked out to be 76 percent for the period 1999-2003. As mentioned earlier, 
scientific assessment of expenditure needs for provision of urban services at reasonable levels 
do not exist. The assessment by the Rakesh Mohan Committee shows that, in 2001-02, the 
annual requirement for urban services was Rs 277.7 billion. As against this, the actual outlay 
on urban infrastructure by central, state and local governments taken together is less than 
one-third, at Rs 90 billion out of which, an overwhelming proportion is spent mainly on 
maintenance. The draft Eleventh Plan document projects the investment requirement for 
water supply, sewerage disposal, waste management and related services at Rs. 1,292 billion 
of which, water supply alone requires Rs. 536.7 billion and urban sewerage and sewerage 
treatment an additional Rs. 531.7 billion.   
 The inability to finance exponentially growing urban public service need is 
compounded by inflexibility and low level of buoyancy in the local tax bases. The 
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assignment system does not provide sufficient revenue handles to urban local governments 
and the only important tax handle is the property tax. In all the states, except Maharashtra, 
octroi has been abolished. Ironically, many of the state governments not only do not bother 
about providing adequate revenue handles to the urban local bodies, but even go about 
abolishing the local taxes for electoral gains leaving the urban local bodies with significant 
unfunded mandates.  In Punjab and Rajasthan, the recent abolition of property taxes is a case 
in point. In other urban local bodies their inability to effect periodic revision in property 
valuation has rendered the tax inelastic in raising revenues. Intergovernmental transfers from 
the state to local governments are characterized by discretion and lack of practicability and 
often serve as disincentive to revenue generation. Unwillingness on the part of the state 
governments to guarantee borrowings by urban local bodies to keep their own off-budget 
liabilities to the minimum to fulfill the fiscal responsibility legislation targets has not helped 
the institutional financing of urban public bodies to the extent desired.   
The implementable rules of the fiscal decentralization require that there should be 
clarity in the assignment system in order to ensure accountability (Bahl, 2002). However, 
overlap in the assignment of functions between states and local bodies on the one hand and 
the local bodies and the independent service providers on the other has been a source of 
ambiguity and confusion. In all multilevel fiscal systems, finances should follow functions. 
However, the local bodies have not been assigned adequate revenue sources and as 
mentioned above, intergovernmental transfers are not systematic and do not keep up with the 
functions assigned. It is important that at the local level there should be linkage between 
revenue expenditure decisions at the margin to ensure accountability and incentives. 
However, the local bodies have failed to collect user charges to bring about stronger link 
between revenue and expenditure decisions and have failed to raise resources from the 
sources of revenue assigned to them.  Thus, revenue from property taxes is low, many of the 
properties are not included in the tax base, undervaluation of those included is phenomenal, 
and even when the tax is levied it is not collected.  The existence of rent control act has only 
added to the problems.  In short, there is no scientific system of determining and periodic 
revision of the base. Thus, own revenues of local bodies are abysmal and transfers are 
inadequate.  Most of the states have been unwilling to extend guarantees to the local bodies 
due to the constraints on the guarantees imposed by the fiscal responsibility legislations and 
therefore, accessing funds from the capital market is difficult. Thus, financing urban 
infrastructure presents one of the most daunting challenges in Indian fiscal scene.   
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The Jawaharlal Nehru National Urban Renewal Mission (JNNURM) is one of the 
recent initiatives taken by the Government of India to deal with the issue of reform and 
financing of urban infrastructure. A novel feature of the program is to take urban 
infrastructure provision in the mission mode and incentivizing the state and the local bodies 
to undertake structural reforms through incentive linked financing programs. It takes on 
board 23 reform initiatives which include inter alia elimination of distortions in land and 
housing markets, more rational pricing of municipal services, empowerment of urban local 
bodies with property tax and user charge reforms, bringing about transparency in the 
accounting systems, inducing increased participation of people in governance and working 
towards better access of public services to the poor. In many ways the reforms proposed 
under JNNURM aim at opening up the ‘municipal sector’. The JNNURM proposes to make 
central investment of US$1.7 billion in 63 cities and an additional investment of US$1 billion 
would be forthcoming.  
While cities in the states of Gujrat, Maharashtra, Andhra Pradesh, and Tamil Nadu 
have moved fast, those in many other states have lagged behind and in some states there is a 
distinct indifference and disregard to the JNNURM protocol. The experience with the 
implementation of the program, has brought out a number of important issues. First, the 
program design seems to have been drawn up in a hurried manner and, therefore, has been 
undergoing considerable changes over time. In other words, even by proper scheduling and 
sequencing of the reforms, it is possible to gain much more synergy. Second, there is capacity 
vacuum in the urban local bodies even for preparing the actual proposal under the JNNURM. 
Third, the system of evaluating the applications and periodic evaluation of the program is not 
yet systematic. While the states agree to undertake reforms, after availing the assistance they 
may not continue with the reforms or may actually reverse them. In fact, the state government 
of Rajasthan, after availing assistance for some of the cities has abolished the property tax on 
residential housing up to a specific floor area. This amounts to fiscal disempowerment of 
urban local bodies. Alongside the assistance, it is necessary to create a pool of resources for 
building capacity in institutions which has not been done. Nevertheless, even with the 
shortcomings, this is an important initiative and is likely to augment urban infrastructure in 
the near future and motivate them for much needed reforms in the area.   
Despite this recent attempt, the issue of financing urban infrastructure remains a 
major challenge. The important reforms in the area should begin with ensuring clarity in the 
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assignment of functions, providing adequate resources to finance the functions and create an 
appropriate incentive structure to mobilize resources and efficiently use them in the urban 
local bodies. An implementing rule of fiscal decentralization is that the functions are assigned 
and the financial resources should follow the functions. It is also important that at the margin 
there should be a linkage between revenue and expenditure decisions and it implies that the 
urban local bodies should have independent revenue sources from which they can raise 
revenues to augment public services according to the preferences of people residing therein. 
While assignment of independent revenue handles is important for ensuring both efficiency 
and accountability, it must be noted that subnational governments have inherent disadvantage 
in raising revenues commensurate with their expenditure responsibilities if the assignment is 
done according to comparative advantage and, therefore, a significant part of their 
expenditures will have to be financed through intergovernmental transfers.   
Financing urban local services through intergovernmental transfers require 
comprehensive assessment and quantification of fiscal capacities and needs. This is required 
to design the transfers so as to ensure comparable levels of urban local services at comparable 
tax rates within a state. Thus, fiscal capacity of an urban local body will provide an estimate 
of the revenue the local body can raise at a given normative tax rate. The shortfall in the 
capacity to raise revenue from a chosen bench mark (average capacity) is one component of 
the transfer system. However, the standards of public service may vary even when the 
capacities across urban local bodies within a state are equalized due to significant differences 
in the cost of providing the services. Expenditure needs can also vary among urban local 
bodies if there are significant differences in the demographic composition of the population. 
In order to offset such cost disabilities and need differences, it is necessary to estimate 
expenditure needs.   
Most of the studies estimating taxable capacities and needs typically employ a cross 
section model and take average as the benchmark to estimate the taxable capacity using either 
a regression approach or the ‘representative tax system’ approach. Similarly, expenditure 
need calculations are done in many ways by regressing quantity and cost variables on 
expenditures to estimate the justifiable cost of providing average standard of public services 
(Reschovsky 2007, Rao and Aggarwal 1994). Such an analysis is possible only when there is 
uniformity in the public services provided and tax bases assigned to urban local bodies. The 
estimation also requires collection of a large volume of data on a comparable basis on various 
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capacity, need and cost variables. Such an approach is not feasible in the context of Indian 
cities because assignments vary significantly among different urban local bodies and 
comparable data on the above mentioned variables are simply not available.  Therefore, the 
only alternative is to estimate the expenditure needs for individual urban agglomerations 
based on exogenously given norms. 
The present study focuses on the different aspects of fiscal health of five major urban 
agglomerations (UAs) in India which are: (1) Chennai (Madras), (2) Delhi, (3) Hyderabad, 
(4) Kolkata, and (5) Pune. The main objective is two- fold. First, to assess the conditions of 
finances and responsibilities in service delivery of the Urban Local Bodies (ULBs) in these 
agglomerations and see whether the revenues generated are sufficient to handle the 
responsibilities assigned to them. This involves a detailed analysis of the expenditures on 
core services, the existing institutional arrangements for service delivery between the local 
governments and independent service providers (parastatal agencies) and also the different 
categories of revenues for these ULBs which also give an idea about the extent of their 
dependence on transfers from the higher tiers of government. 
Second, on the basis of the existing state of finances and responsibilities of the ULBs, 
needs and capacities are estimated for each of the urban agglomerations using specific norms 
and based on the assignment of functions to each of their constituent ULBs and their existing 
revenue handles. The difference between the two gives the fiscal gap. The gap can be reduced 
by (i) reducing the functions of urban local bodies, which is against the principle of 
subsidiarity; (ii) assigning more revenue handles which, beyond a point may not be feasible 
as the benefits of fiscal decentralization may be outweighed by losses on account of fiscal 
disharmony (Rao, 2007) and (iii) by providing adequate intergovernmental transfers to offset 
the vertical and horizontal imbalances.  In the absence of any of the above, the ULBs will be 
left with unfunded mandates and as they do not have any way of resolving the issue, the 
public service delivery will suffer.   
The analysis begins with the description of the five UAs and the constituent ULBs, 
their socio-demographic characteristics, status of core services and a glimpse of economic 
activities in section 2.  Section 3 analyzes the finances of the local bodies bringing in detailed 
service wise break-up of total expenditures and source wise composition of revenues.  
Sections 4 and 5 provide the description of data, methodology and results of estimations of 
expenditure needs and revenue capacities respectively. Fiscal gaps and a few other indicators 
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of fiscal health are estimated and analyzed in Section 6. Section 7 gives the major 
conclusions and summarizes the data caveats and limitations of the study. 
2. Urban Agglomerations: Some Characteristics 
The selection of the five UAs, though is partly subject to availability of data on local 
governments, the objective basis in terms of coverage and diversity of the entire nation is also 
not missing. First of all, efforts have been taken to make the sample representative of the 
entire nation as best as possible. Secondly, all the UAs chosen for the study have recorded, 
over the last decade, a faster pace of urbanization reflected in greater decline in primary 
sector activities, greater orientation towards manufacturing and services sector and higher 
literacy rates of population than the national average for Urban India.2 Table 1 gives a broad 
overview of the five urban agglomerations chosen for the study in terms of location and 
number of constituent ULBs.   
Table 1 Urban Agglomerations: An Introduction 
Urban 
Agglomeration 
State District Number of 
ULBs 
Hyderabad  Andhra Pradesh (Southern 
India)
Hyderabad, Rangareddy 113 
Chennai Tamil Nadu (Southern tail of 
ndia) 
Chennai, Kancheepuram, Thiruvallur 364 
Kolkata  West Bengal (Eastern India) Kolkata, 24 Paraganas (North), 24 
Paraganas (South), Hugli, Haora, Nadia. 
41 
Delhi  Delhi (Northern India) Delhi 3 
Pune  Maharashtra (West to  Central 
India) 
Pune 5 
Source: Census of India, 2001  
                                                            
2  The comparisons are in terms of the national urban averages subject to availability of data, See 
NIPFP 2007(a)(b)(c)(d), NIPFP (2008)(a)(b) for details on individual cities; the average literacy rate for 
urban India is 65% according to Census of India, 2001.   
3  In late 2007, all the ULBs in Hyderabad have been merged to one Greater Hyderabad Municipal 
Corporation (GHMC). Our surveys were conducted before that, so we have considered the 11 ULB 
budgets separately.   
4 Our analysis is based on 8 ULBs in Chennai  
 
 
9
A comparative analysis of some important socio-demographic indicators of these UAs 
is helpful in getting a better idea about their fiscal health.  In this study, the analysis has been 
carried out for the central cities (Table 2) and the surrounding ULBs in the non central cities 
(Tables 3 and.4) separately in order to compare the two categories of ULBs in an 
agglomeration and each category across agglomerations.  
The main observations on central cities (Table 2) can be summarised as follows: 
 According to Census 2001, the population of central cities range between 2.5 million 
to 10 million; The number of households varied from 500,000 to 3.2 million;  The 
area varied from 173 sq. kms to 1397 sq kms, the population growth during the period 
from 1991 to 2001 varied from a mere 4 percent in Kolkata Municipal Corporation 
(KMC) to 62 percent in Pune Municipal Corporation (PMC); density of population 
per sq. km area varied from 6,000 persons to 25,000 persons and literacy rates from 
76 percent to 85 percent..    
 In terms of area, the Municipal Corporation of Delhi (MCD) is the largest followed by 
Pune (PMC), while Kolkata (KMC), Chennai (COC) and Hyderabad (MCH) 
corporations are almost of the same size.   
Table 2 Socio Demographic Characteristics: Central Cities 
Central City 
Area (Sq. 
Km.) 
Households Population 
Population 
Growth  
1991-2001 
(%) 
Population 
Density  
(Persons per 
Sq Km) 
 
Literacy 
Rates 
(%) 
Municipal Corporation 
of Hyderabad 
173 660,363 3,658,510 20 20,917 78 
Corporation of       
Chennai 
174 962,213 4,343,645 13 24,963 85 
Kolkata  Municipal 
Corporation 
186 931,402 4,580,546 4 24,596 83 
Municipal Corporation 
of Delhi 
1,397 3,247,838 10,679,152 48 7,643 82 
Pune Municipal 
Corporation 
430 555,771 2,538,473 62 5,903 76 
Source: Census of India, 2001, Authors’ Computations 
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 In terms of population and number of households, Delhi records the highest numbers, 
and Pune the lowest. Kolkata and Chennai are in the same row (with Kolkata having a 
marginally higher average size of households), followed by Hyderabad. 
 In terms of population growth, Pune records the highest followed by Delhi, 
Hyderabad, Chennai and Kolkata. The lowest numbers in Kolkata can be attributable 
to   massive out-migration due to closing down of industries while the highest number 
in Pune is partly due to its rapid gain in importance in the nineties as an investment 
destination in Maharashtra with over-saturation in Mumbai.  
For the ULBs in the non central cities the major observations are5: 
 While total area covered by the ULBS in the non central cities is the maximum in 
Kolkata followed by Hyderabad, Chennai and Pune and the minimum in Delhi; Pune 
has the highest variation in terms of size of the smaller ULBs whereas Delhi has the 
least variation.  
 The number of households and population figures are the highest for Kolkata (with 
maximum variation amongst ULBs) followed by Hyderabad. 
 
Table 3 Proportion of Area and Population of Smaller ULBs   
UA Area (%) Population (%)  
Hyderabad 77 34 
Chennai 54 226 
Kolkata 79 63 
Delhi 6 4 
Pune 35 32 
                  Note: The proportions are in terms of total population and total area of the respective UAs.            
                 Source: Census of India, 2001, Authors’ Computations. 
 
                                                            
5 In terms of average values, for details see Tables 3 and 4. 
6  In Chennai we have considered 8 out of the 36 municipal governments which account for 89 
percent of the UA’s population, as well as of the UA’s households, and 59 percent of the UA’s land 
area.     
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 Highest population growth is recorded in Pune followed by Hyderabad and the lowest 
in Delhi; the highest variation in population growth is recorded in Chennai. 
 Smaller ULBs in Kolkata on an average have the highest population density with 
highest variation followed by Hyderabad. 
 Table 4 Socio Demographic Characteristics: Smaller ULBs 
Urban 
Agglomeration 
Area (Sq. 
Km.) 
Total 
(Maximum; 
Minimum) 
Households 
Total 
(Maximum;      
Minimum) 
Population 
 
Total 
(Maximum; 
Minimum) 
Growth rate 
1991-2001 
(%) 
Average 
(Maximum; 
Minimum)
Population Density 
(Persons per sq.km) 
Average 
(Maximum; 
Minimum) 
Literacy 
Rates 
(%) 
Average 
(Maximum; 
Minimum)
Hyderabad  
580  
(103; 18) 
410,180  
(65,211;   19,748) 
1,899,081  
(292,289;  94,372) 
67 
(116; 20) 
3,276 
 (10,770; 1,565) 
78 
(83;  63) 
Chennai  
202 
(65; 17) 
292,928  
(174,145; 73,630) 
1,257,587 
 (310,967; 76,093) 
46  
(1,118; 16) 
6,220 
 (9,910; 3,529) 
87 
(92; 85) 
Kolkata  
705 
 (55; 3) 
1,652,518  
(211,441;   6,772) 
7,865,180 
 (1,007,532; 33,858)
47  
(459; -1) 
11,144  
(38,337; 1,835) 
84 
(94; 69) 
Delhi  
86  
(43; 43) 
94,079  
(69,034; 25,045) 
427,260  
(302,343; 124,917)
8 
(39; -1) 
4,970  
(7,031; 2,907) 
NA 
Pune  
234 
(171; 13) 
272,003  
(231,562;   9,773) 
1,216,831 
(1,012,472; 46,921)
69 
(96; -3) 
5,209  
(5,938; 1,303) 
77 
(82; 73) 
Source: Census of India, 2001, Authors’ Computations 
   
Water supply, sewerage/sanitation, solid waste management, roads and street lighting 
are the five core services chosen for this study. Most ULBs in India are responsible to 
provide these services. In addition to these services some ULBs have the responsibility to 
provide primary education and health care facilities. Apart from these a variety of other 
expenditures  are incurred, common among these being expenses on general administration, 
slum rehabilitation, pensions, expenses for buying land, fire fighting, with slight variations 
across ULBs.  
The status of five major services in the UAs are summarized in Tables 5, 6 and 7 
below. The information presented in the tables suggests the following: 
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Table 5 Water Sources and Sewerage Systems in UAs 7 
Sewerage Sources of Water 
Urban 
Agglomeration Central City 
Non-Central City 
(Proportion of ULBs covered by Sources) 
Central City 
Non-Central City 
(Proportion of ULBs 
covered by Sources) 
Hyderabad   S, OSD S, OSD (20%); OSD(70%); BSD(10%) T, TW T (60%); T, TW 
(30%); TW,T (10%) 
Chennai  S OSD (100%) TW,T TW (28.5%); T 
(28.5%); W (43%) 
Kolkata  S, OSD S, OSD (10%); OSD (62%); OSD, 
S(10%);OSD,BSD(5%);S (3%); OSD,O 
T,TW  T,TW (72.5%); TW,T 
(12.5%); T (5%); TW 
Delhi   NA  S (100%) T,TW T,TW (100%) 
Pune  S S (50%); S/OSD (50%) T T (50%); TW/T (25%); 
TW/T/W/TK (25%) 
Notes: S-Sewer network; OSD-Open Surface Drain; BSD-Box Surface Drain; PT-Pit system; and O-Other types 
of sewerage. T-Tap water; TW-Tube well; W-Well water; and TK-tank water; ‘ ,’  implies ‘and’ ; / implies ‘or’ 
Source: Census of India, 2001, Authors’ Computations 
 Only the central city in Pune has full coverage with tap water, while both Pune and 
Chennai have full coverage by sewer network; Connectivity through roads as 
measured by road length per thousand population is the best in Chennai and the worst 
in Hyderabad; street lighting facilities are better in the central cities of Pune than in 
other ULBs but the worst in Hyderabad. 
 When non central cities are considered, the order of the UAs in terms of status of 
these services is different from those observed in central cities. While smaller ULBs 
in Hyderabad are better off in terms of availability of tap water, the conditions are 
worse in Kolkata. Sewerage facilities are the best in the non central cities of Delhi 
which has full coverage through sewer network followed by Pune which has  50 
percent coverage while the smaller ULBs in Chennai does not have sewer network at 
all. In terms of comparable indicators on roads and street lighting it is found that the 
                                                            
7  The percentages in brackets for non central cities denote the proportion of the non central cities 
covered by the respective category of water source/sewerage system. For instance [S, OSD (20%)] 
would mean 20% of the smaller ULBs in Hyderabad UA have a combination of sewer network and 
open surface drains in which sewer network dominates. It is to be noted that the order in which the 
categories are mentioned in cases of multiple categories is important; (S, OSD) would mean a 
combination in which sewer network dominates whereas (OSD, S) would mean a combination in 
which open surface drains dominates.   
conditions are worst in smaller ULBs in Chennai while those in Hyderabad non 
central cities are better than the lot. 
 Also, conditions in the smaller ULBs in Hyderabad are better than the smaller ULBs 
of other UAs. The conditions are moderate in Pune, both for central city and non 
central city. 
Table 6  Roads in UAs 
Source: Census of India, 2001, Authors’ Computations 
Central City 
Non Central City 
Average 
(Maximum, Minimum) 
Urban 
Agglomeration 
Pucca Road Length 
(KM) 
Road Length(KM) per 
Thousand Population 
Pucca Road 
Length (KM) 
Road Length (KM) per 
Thousand Population 
Hyderabad Urban 
Agglomeration 
7,130 0.19 186.40  
(425, 32) 
1.42 
 (2.05, 0.45) 
Chennai Urban 
Agglomeration 
2,920 0.70 
144.28 
 (421.7, 14) 
0.85 
 (1.37, 0.06) 
Kolkata Urban 
Agglomeration 
1,585 0.41 145.75 
 (476, 10) 
1.17  
(5, 0) 
Delhi Urban 
Agglomeration 
NA NA NA NA 
Pune Urban 
Agglomeration 
760 0.34 
214.43 
 (641.92, 40.8) 
1.08  
(2.34, 0.53) 
 
In terms of these broad comparisons we can say that there is a considerable difference 
in the status of these services in the central city and smaller ULBs in each UA. However, this 
difference in terms of coverage is the minimum in Hyderabad, if central cities are compared 
with non central cities. In fact the indicators show better status for street lights and roads in 
the smaller ULBs than the central cities in Hyderabad. However, this may be caused by the 
smaller population and lower number of households in the smaller ULBs. However in the 
absence of comparable indicators on the supply and availability of these services in the ULBs 
comparisons are restricted to these coverage indicators only.  
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Table 7 Street Lighting in UAs 
Central City 
Non Central City 
Average  
(Maximum, Minimum)  
Urban Agglomeration 
Number of Street 
Lights 
Households per 
Street Light 
Number of Street 
Lights 
Households per Street 
Light 
Hyderabad Urban 
Agglomeration 
18,138  36 6,368 
(10,300, 1,465)
11 
 (44, 2) 
Chennai Urban 
Agglomeration 
79,303 12 5,922 
(1,7606,  25)
199  
(1,350, 4)
Kolkata Urban 
Agglomeration 
78,354 12 
3,408 
 (12,000, 55) 
20 
 (181, 3) 
Delhi Urban 
Agglomeration 
NA NA NA NA 
Pune Urban 
Agglomeration 
59,001 9 2,323 
(4,000, 739)
82 
 (313, 4)
Source: Census of India, 2001, Authors’ Computations 
  
3.  Finances of Urban Local Bodies 
 We analyze the finances of the ULBs by considering expenditures and revenues 
separately. The main sources of information on expenditures and revenues of ULBs are the 
Annual Administrative Reports, Budgets of the ULBs, the City Development Reports, and 
Environmental Status Reports, depending on availability at the city level. The smaller ULBs 
in India do not maintain systematic records of their finances. The data for this study were 
collected through extensive field visits to all the ULBs by circulating questionnaires 
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structured according to the needs of the study8. In this analysis we have used the data for the 
year 2004-05. All the financial variables are expressed in 2004-05 prices9.  
Expenditures 
  For expenditures we concentrate on the service wise break up in each ULB on the five 
major services for comparisons across UAs. A considerable proportion of the total 
expenditures are spent on account of other expenditures which we have considered later in 
the analysis. It is to be noted that for Delhi, Chennai and Hyderabad, water supply and 
sewerage boards share the responsibilities with the ULBs. The manner in which the 
responsibilities are divided between the municipal government and the parastatal agency, 
however, is not the same in all the UAs.  
The Delhi Jal Board (DJB) covers both capital and O&M expenditures but only for 
the central city; the smaller ULBs purchase in bulk from the DJB. Hyderabad Metropolitan 
Water Supply and Sewerage Board (HMWSSB) covers capital and O&M expenditures for 4 
ULBs including the central city; other ULBs purchase in bulk from the HMWSSB. Planning, 
execution, management of network is done by the ULBs themselves. However there is a 
proposal for full coverage of capital and O&M expenditures of the entire area of the GHMC 
by the HMWSSB. Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply and Sewerage Board (CMWSSB) 
covers O&M and capital expenditures for the central city; the other ULBs cover their capital 
expenditure themselves. However they transfer resources on account of augmentation or new 
capital work to the Board and the planning, execution and management of new capital work 
is done by the CMWSSB. All these Boards recover costs by borrowing funds from state and 
financial institutions, as they incur perpetual losses10. All these UAs have mostly metered 
connections, private and government tankers are also available for additional supply.    
 
8  The surveys were conducted for the Project titled ‘Improving Fiscal Health of Indian Cities’ funded 
jointly by the World Bank. The contribution of the research team of the Project for their inputs in 
designing the questionnaires, communicating with the ULB officials and conducting these surveys is 
gratefully acknowledged. Some further clarifications and additions in the dataset were made for this 
particular analysis. However, the methodology, particularly for the estimation of expenditure needs is 
entirely different than that used in the project. See NIPFP (2007)(a),(b),(c), NIPFP 2008(a),(b).  
9  For Kolkata the most recent data available is for 2003-04, so we have expressed the figures in 
constant 2004-05 prices with the standard sector specific deflators available for water supply gas and 
electricity (used for water supply and street lighting), roads (used for roads) and other services (used 
for sewerage and solid waste management). 
10 CMWSSB is the only Board which has earned profits in the past for some years. 
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 The other services for which we find sharing of responsibilities are solid waste 
management, where the Residents’ Welfare Associations and some private initiatives are 
found to have a role in Delhi and Pune; and roads for which Public Works Department and 
other state authorities are involved in all the UAs. 
 Table 811 summarizes the expenditures in per capita terms on account of the five basic 
services of the UAs. The main observations suggest:  
 Among the central cities Pune records the highest expenditures per capita on water 
supply while Hyderabad incurs the lowest12; Pune also incurs the highest expenditures 
on sewerage while Delhi the lowest; Delhi incurs the highest expenditures on solid 
waste management while Hyderabad incurs the highest expenditures on roads and 
street lighting; Chennai incurs the lowest expenditures on three services, solid waste 
management, roads and street lighting.  
 Among the non central cities, Hyderabad incurs the highest expenditures on water 
supply and sewerage while Pune incurs the highest expenditures on the other three 
services. While Chennai incurs the lowest expenditures on three services, water 
supply, sewerage and solid waste management, Hyderabad incurs the lowest 
expenditure on roads and Kolkata the lowest, for street lights 
 
11 These are the O&M expenditures which are recurrent in nature. It is to be noted that we have not 
considered capital expenditures as service wise capital expenditures data is not available for majority 
of the ULBs. Among the services chosen, a major proportion of total expenditures on water supply , 
sewerage and roads are capital expenditures while for solid waste management almost the entire 
expenditure is on O&M and revenue, for street lighting the proportion of capital expenditure is 
moderate. The problems of estimating capital expenditure on each service taking prorata shares are 
many fold. First, the capital work for water supply and sewerage are jointly incurred, sometimes 
sanitation is also combined. So allocating the part attributable to a particular service aries from one 
project to another depending upon the nature of projects. Second, Grants and aid from multilateral 
agencies are often used for capital work, which are project specific; for roads there are higher tiers of 
governments involved for the capital work. Multiplicity in donators often makes it difficult to apportion 
the shares for a particular service due to lack of records. Third, in cases of such lumpy investments 
which are indivisible over time, annual data is difficult to be maintained. Fourth, the proportion of 
capital expenditures in total expenditure depends on the existing infrastructure in the city, and thus 
will be different over time as the city develops. However, we have used the relation between 
aggregate revenue and capital expenditures at the state level to estimate capital expenditure needs in 
the latter part of the analysis. 
12  Chennai’s expenditure on water supply and sewerage and Delhi’s for roads and street lights are 
combined together, so they are not considered for comparisons for each of these services. 
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 A comparison of the expenditures of the central city and the (median value) of the non 
central city of a UA13 reveals that it is not always higher in the central city. For 
instance, in Chennai the central city spends lesser than the median spending by non 
central cities in two services viz. solid waste management and street lights; in 
Hyderabad for three services, water supply, sewerage and solid waste management 
and in Pune for three services viz solid waste management, roads and street lighting. 
  A word of caution may apply. For each service, there is a considerable variation in the 
per capita expenditures for the non central cities. This is because of the variations in their 
size, population, population growth and density, and topography. So, the above comparisons 
on the basis of median per capita expenditures are subject to these variations. While 
comparing expenditures in per capita terms between the central and non central cities we 
have to keep in mind that central cities have larger populations than the non central 
counterparts. Also the extent of scale economies varies across services and depends on the 
size of the city as well as the maturity of its development process.   
 
 
 
 
13 Chennai, Hyderabad and Pune are three UAs for which this comparison is attempted. Relevant data 
on the variables used for the analysis are not available for any of the non central cities of Delhi and 
central city of Kolkata.  
 
 
18 
Table 8 Service wise Expenditures (O&M Per Capita) of UAs, (Rs, 2004-05) 
Water Supply Sewerage Solid Waste 
Management 
Roads Street Lights UA 
Central 
City 
Non Central 
City  
Median 
(Maximum, 
Minimum)  
Central 
City 
Non Central 
City  
Median 
(Maximum, 
Minimum)  
Central 
City 
Non Central 
City  
Median 
(Maximum, 
Minimum)  
Central 
City 
Non Central 
City  
Median 
(Maximum, 
Minimum)  
Central 
City 
Non Central 
City  
Median 
(Maximum, 
Minimum)  
Delhi  100   8   250   12714     
Chennai  61215 
 
30  
(68, 1)  
  7 
(117, 1) 
6 
 
26
(114, 2) 
29  
 
1.29  
( 80 , 0.17)  
6  40  
  (67 , 2)  
Hyderabad  10  225  
(287, 49) 
11 
 
33 
(236, 2) 
175  51 
(51 , 51) 
83 
 
5 
(71 ,   2) 
84 
 
66 
(101, 0.41) 
Kolkata    45 
(120, 9) 
  19 
(92, 1) 
  50 
(145, 6) 
  15 
(62, 2 ) 
  18 
(72, 3) 
Pune  418 
 
106 
(262 ,  6) 
79 
 
28 
(29, 19) 
154 
 
235 
(413, 168) 
41 
 
94 
(292, 58) 
65 
 
78 
(81, 74) 
              Source: ULB Budgets, Authors’ Computations  
                                                            
14 Combined expenditure for roads and street lights 
15 Combined expenditure on water supply and sewerage.  
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Revenues 
 The revenue categories are roughly the same for all the ULBs with slight differences 
in the sub-categories because of the differences in the structure, functions and nature of 
economic activities pursued in the big municipal corporations, smaller municipalities and 
cantonment boards. These differences are reflected mostly in the grants, octroi16 and the 
‘other tax’ components.  
 The total revenue can be broadly divided into own source revenues and transfers from 
upper tiers of the government. The own source component has tax revenues and non tax 
revenues. Property tax and octroi are the main components of the tax sources. Property Tax is 
sometimes integrated with other charges for services like water and conservancy and in some 
places collected with transfer surcharge /stamp duty. The valuation is done mostly by Annual 
Rental Value (rate based method) or Unit Area Method (depending on characteristics of the 
locality and property). Self assessment valuation method is only followed in Delhi in our 
sample; all the other UAs follow ARV method based on unit area characteristics. This class 
of valuation methods assesses the rental values of properties based on the characteristics and 
location of the properties and then work out the rates according to the magnitude of the 
values after some deductions on account of maintenance and some standard exemptions. 
 
16 Maharashtra is one state in India which still imposes octroi. The goods manufactured in Pune and 
going out of its territory are charged lump sum amounts according to their sale values whereas goods 
entering into the market of Pune for sale are charged at specified rates varying mostly between 1-3% 
of their transacted values, the minimum rate being 0.5 % and the maximum 6%. In case the goods 
entering into the jurisdiction are not sold, 10% of the potential transacted value goes to the 
municipality funds. Though octroi is the major source of revenue for municipalities imposing it, 
because of its distortionary impact it is a nationwide policy to abolish octroi at the earliest for any 
municipality which still imposes it. Octroi rates are amended from time to time but same rates are 
being followed by all the municipalities.  Octroi rules are part of the Bombay Provincial Municipal 
Corporation Act 1949, with successive amendments. Recently a number of instances of shut down of 
big production companies all over Maharashtra make it very clear that in near future the state has to 
take a decision on abolition of octroi if it wants to retain its production base. Because of this for 
revenue capacity estimations, we have focused on an analysis considering revenues without octroi. 
The cantonment boards are eligible for some special grants from the upper tiers of the government, 
apart from the regular grants for education which all the municipalities get. Apart from their own 
collections from their check posts, Kirkee Cantonment Board and Pune Cantonment Board get shares 
of Pune Municipal Corporation’s octroi while Dehu Cantonment Board generates octroi from its own 
check posts only. Most recent data shows that PMC shared around 2% of its octroi collection to each 
of these cantonment boards. 
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The ‘other taxes’ can include toll taxes, taxes on advertisements, trade and 
profession, carts and carriages, animals, pilgrim tax (Chennai), Howrah Bridge tax (Kolkata), 
tax on sale and supply of electricity (Delhi).  The non tax revenue consists of sale proceeds of 
land, rent from the land property of the ULB, rent from leases, proceeds from licenses, rent 
from the land other than the property of Government, sale of trees, and receipts from public 
gardens.  
 Transfers are generally a negotiated formula depending upon the status of commercial 
and economic activities of the state viz. population, deprivation index, difference with the 
highest income state, various compensations for alterations in tax regimes, etc. Transfers are 
composed of assigned revenues and grants. Assigned /shared revenues generally come from 
entertainment tax, motor vehicles tax, stamp duty/surcharge and various shared taxes which 
may vary across states and so across UAs. Grants mainly is composed of the Grants in aid 
component which is generally on account of education (Delhi, Pune), or road maintenance 
(Hyderabad) or others. 
Table 9 summarizes the revenues in per capita terms from different sources of the 
UAs. An analysis of these per capita revenue figures suggests: 
 For the central cities Chennai collects the highest per capita property tax, Pune the 
lowest.  However, both tax and non tax collections are the highest in Pune .Due to 
huge octroi collections at checkposts, the highest collection in total revenues as well is 
recorded in Pune.  However, the intergovernmental transfer component in revenue is 
the highest in Delhi and the lowest in Pune. Both tax and non tax, and thus the 
aggregate own revenue collections, are the lowest in Hyderabad.  
 For non central cities property tax collections are the highest in Hyderabad. While 
Pune takes the lead in the other own revenue components and the total revenues, per 
capita transfers are the highest in Hyderabad. While Chennai records the lowest levels 
of transfers, Kolkata records the lowest levels of all the own revenue components and 
total revenue also.   
 It is not always the case that the central cities generate more revenues than the non 
central cities (median value) in a UA in per capita terms.  For instance, per capita 
property tax collection is higher in central cities than in non central cities for the three 
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UAs viz. Chennai, Hyderabad and Pune but total tax collections are lesser in central 
cities of Pune than in non central cities.  Non tax revenue collections of central cities 
are lower than the non central cities in all the three UAs mentioned above.  
 Own revenue collections are lower in central cities for Hyderabad and Pune than their 
non central counterparts. The intergovernmental transfers component is almost equal 
in central and non central cities of Pune while for the two other UAs the central cities 
earn more transfers than the non central counterparts. Total revenues are also lower in 
central cities of Pune and Hyderabad than their non central counterparts.      
 For central cities, broadly speaking, the performance of Pune in terms of revenue 
generation is the best and Hyderabad, the worst.  For non central cities, Kolkata is by 
far the worst in terms of revenue collections and Pune again the best while Hyderabad 
collects the highest per capita property taxes. The lower property tax collections in 
Pune are a direct consequence of the octroi overshadowing the importance of other 
own revenue potentials which is visible in both the central and non central cities of the 
UA. 
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Table 9 Source Wise Revenues (Per Capita) of UAs, (in. 2004-05 Rupees) 
Property Tax Total Tax Non Tax Own Revenue Transfers Total Revenue UA 
Central 
City 
 
 
 
Non Central 
City 
 Median 
(Maximum,, 
Minimum)  
Central 
City 
Non Central 
City 
 Median 
(Maximum,, 
Minimum)  
Central 
City 
Non Central 
City 
 Median 
(Maximum,, 
Minimum)  
Central 
City 
Non Central 
City 
 Median 
(Maximum,, 
Minimum)  
Central 
City 
Non Central 
City 
 Median 
(Maximum,, 
Minimum)  
Central 
City 
Non Central 
City 
 Median 
(Maximum,, 
Minimum)  
Delhi 427  710  112  822  466  1,288  
Chennai 489 
 
216 
(275, 37) 
593 
 
290 
(371 , 77) 
156 
 
319 
(677 , 67) 
750 
 
526 
(1,003 , 24) 
441 
 
92 
(583 , 3) 
1,191 
 
664 
(1,095, 
Hyderabad 405 295 
(424 , 89) 
407 
 
380 
(1,211, 94) 
140 
 
355 
(840,   168) 
547 
 
811 
(1,502,583) 
313 
 
273 
(661, 146) 
860 
 
964 
(1,886 ,723) 
Kolkata  88 
(307 , 15) 
 109 
(351 , 17) 
 103 
(243 , 12) 
 190 
(455 , 29) 
 254 
(518 , 101) 
 435 
(973 , 197) 
Pune 211 
 
117 
(350 , 23) 
1,327 
 
2260 
(3003, 1595) 
874 
 
565 
(3208 , 253) 
2,200 
 
3484 
(4803,  
1940) 
163 
 
164 
(272 , 88) 
2,363 
 
3664 
(5017, 2054) 
Source: ULB Budgets, Authors’ Computations 
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Figures A 1–A 8 in the Appendix give the details of the composition of revenues in 
the UAs. A close look at the composition of own revenues reveals that in the central cities of 
all the UAs, it is the tax component in own source revenues which dominates. As far as the 
non central cities are concerned shares of tax collections are higher than those of the non tax 
collections in Hyderabad and Kolkata, while in Chennai it is just the reverse. In Pune for the 
central city in the ‘without octroi’ scenario, the share of non tax revenues is much higher than 
that of the tax revenues (almost three and a half times larger) but for the non central cities it is 
the share of tax revenues that is slightly higher than that of the non tax revenues.   
An analysis of the intergovernmental transfers component across the central and non 
central categories of ULBs reveals that the smaller ULBs are more dependent on grants while 
the central cities on ‘shared taxes’. For Pune, presently octroi is the major source of revenues 
for both central and non central cities and the extent of dependence on grants is lower 
compared to other cities. Even in the scenario ‘without octroi’ and with the compensation 
according to our calculations, the dependence on transfers will not be very high. The central 
cities in our sample can generate, on an average, around 65 percent of their revenues from 
own sources. Even the smaller ULBs in Hyderabad and Chennai generate around three fourth 
of their revenues from own fund. However, the smaller ULBs in Kolkata are heavily 
dependent on transfers as more than half of their revenues come from intergovernmental 
transfers.  
4. Estimation of Expenditure Needs  
The expenditure need of a ULB is the expenditure required to provide a minimum 
standard for the bundle of services which the local bodies are assigned to provide.  Estimation 
of expenditure needs is a methodological challenge.  Most of the studies estimate expenditure 
needs from actual expenditures on different services provided by the local governments. 
Expenditures actually incurred at the local government level do not necessarily match with 
these needs. 
A common way out is to estimate an expenditure function in the reduced form 
equation for various public services.  In the equation cross –section data on expenditures on a 
service across different urban local bodies are regressed on variables representing quantity 
and cost of providing the service.  The cost of providing an average or any other normative 
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standard of a given public service can be defined as the expenditure need for the service.  The 
expenditure needs added for all services is the aggregate expenditure need17.  
Expenditures of a local government would depend on a vector of public services it has 
to provide and a set of factors determining the cost of service provision. The cost factors 
again, may be within the control of the ULBs or beyond their control.  By substituting the 
average (normative) value of quantity variables and cost variables that are within the control 
of the ULBs and actual values of the variables representing cost factors beyond the control of 
the ULBs, estimates of expenditure needs are arrived at for each of the services.  These can 
be aggregated to get the total expenditure need.  Estimation of need is necessary not only for 
designing the transfer system, but for the very planning of public service provision.  
Allocation of resources to various services in the budget in a scientific manner is possible 
only when the expenditure needs are estimated properly.   
 However, there are some difficulties in estimating expenditures by employing this 
methodology.  At a general level, when single equation OLS models are used for estimation, 
there can be an element of simultaneity.  Of course, this can be overcome by employing two-
stage models.  But the problem in the context of Indian ULBs related to heterogeneity in the 
functions assigned to ULBs and non availability of data at the required level of 
disaggregation is insurmountable.    
There are some specific problems with the data as well.  First, analysis of the 
composition of expenditures in the ULBs shows that a big chunk18 of total expenditures is 
clubbed under ‘other expenditures’.  These services can include expenditure on hospitals and 
dispensaries, education, pensions, general administration, fire fighting, maintenance of 
libraries, parks and other facilities and many other categories which are very specific to the 
functions of ULBs.  Estimating a cost function for such a heterogonous category would be 
meaningless. Also, estimating the expenditure needs of ULBs with only the five core services 
 
17  For a discussion of various methods used to estimate expenditure needs in different countries 
around the world see Reschovsky (2007) 
18  Kolkata ( 47%median value for smaller ULBs);  Delhi (73% including Education, 52% excluding 
Education; Pune  central city (62%), Non central city (85%); Hyderabad  (central City 63%, Non 
central city (73%) Chennai central city 43%, non central city 78%. 
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would be a gross underestimation of their actual needs19. Nor is it possible to define physical 
norms for such a category.  
 Because of these problems we have estimated the expenditure needs for individual 
ULBs based on exogenously given norms.  First, we estimate the current expenditure needs 
for various services based on norms relating to population and other characteristics of the 
ULBs20.  The need in respect of “other expenditures” has been estimated by taking the 
median value of other expenditure component of each ULB during the last five years. These 
values are added to the aggregate expenditure needs for the core services to get total current 
expenditure needs of a ULB. 
 The next step is to estimate the capital expenditure needs of ULBs. In the absence of 
disaggregated data and problems with lumpy capital expenditures mentioned in the previous 
section, we have used the ratio of capital to revenue expenditures of all the ULBs in the 
respective states21 in which the UAs are located to derive the capital expenditure needs on the 
basis of revenue expenditure needs estimated by us. The assumption is that the prevailing 
ratio of capital expenditure to current expenditure will hold.  The last step would be to add 
the two categories of expenditure needs, capital and revenue, to arrive at aggregate 
expenditure needs of ULBs. Table 10 summarizes the estimated expenditure needs of UAs.  
  A review of studies on financial norms show that the norms set up by the Zakaria 
Committee (1963) have been updated by all subsequent studies and working groups of the 
government by simply adjusting for price increases. Mathur et al (2007) gives a 
comprehensive summary of the literature on norms for Indian ULBs. They have considered 
the norms suggested from time to time, important among which are those by Zakaria 
 
19 A set of reduced form regressions for Kolkata with a time series data was attempted to estimate the 
expenditure needs on only the five services at the ULB level. See NIPFP 2007(a) for details. 
20 For Delhi the proportion of Education on other expenditures is around 22% which is quite high. On 
the basis of the norm suggested by National Policy of Education (1986) in terms of minimum average 
salary of teachers and with the help of the existing teacher student ratio and the proportion of salaries 
of teachers in total expenditures in schools in Delhi, we can convert these norms into per capita 
expenditures and take out Education from the other services by specifying a norm.    
21 According to the Report of the Twelfth Finance Commission the ratio of total capital expenditure to 
total revenue expenditure in West Bengal, Andhra Pradesh, Maharashtra, and Tamil Nadu are 15%, 
26%, 43%, and 52% respectively, while the all India figure stands at 33%. This ratio for Delhi is not 
available from any reliable source. We have assumed this ratio to be 50% in Delhi, higher than the 
national average and at par with the better performing states like Maharashtra. 
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Committee, National Institute of Urban Affairs (1995), Planning Commission (1983), ORG 
(1989), National Policy on Education (1986). We have used current expenditure norms for 
water supply, sewerage/sanitation and solid waste management on the basis of the National 
Institute of Urban Affairs (NIUA)\, as this is the most recent study on these norms (NIUA, 
1995). The norms on roads and street lights are not specified in this study. We have referred 
to the most recent study available on these norms by PricewaterhouseCoopers(2001). The 
norms on O&M used from different sources for our analysis are tabulated in Table A 1 in the 
Appendix.   
Table 10. Estimated Expenditure Needs (Per Capita) of ULBs (Rs, 2004-05) 
Expenditure Need Revenue Expenditure Need 
Capital 
Expenditure Need Total  
UA 
Central 
City 
Non Central City 
Median, 
(Maximum, 
Minimum)  
Central 
City 
Non Central 
City  
Median, 
(Maximum, 
Minimum)  
Central 
City 
Non Central 
City 
Median, 
(Maximum, 
Minimum)  
Delhi 1,236  618  1,854  
Chennai 995 
 
       865 
     (2,996, 465)  
517 
 
450  
(1,558, 242)  
1,513 
 
1,314  
(4,555, 706)  
Hyderabad 1098 
 
637 
   (1,125, 238) 
285 
 
166 
   (293, 62) 
1,383 
 
802 
(1,418, 299) 
Kolkata         862 
   (862, 730) 
 129 
(129, 109) 
      991 
(991, 839) 
Pune 2,673 
 
2,665 
(2,743, 2,581) 
1,149 
 
      1,146 
(1,179, 1,110) 
3,822 
 
3,811 
(3,922, 3,691) 
Source: Authors’ Computations  
 
 It is interesting to note that  
 Pune records the highest expenditure needs (capital, revenue and total), both 
for central and non central cities. But this is mainly caused by higher other 
expenditure needs estimated. 
 The lowest revenue expenditure need is recorded in Chennai for central cities 
while Kolkata records the lowest revenue expenditure needs for non central 
cities. Hyderabad records the lowest capital expenditure needs and total 
expenditure needs for central cities.  
 The highest degrees of variations for the smaller ULBs in all the components 
of expenditure needs are recorded in Chennai. 
5. Estimation of Revenue Capacity 
‘Revenue-raising capacity’ of a local government differs from the actual revenues 
raised by a local government.  The revenue-raising capacity refers to the maximum amount of 
revenue a government can raise at a standard (often average) tax rate, or set of tax rates when 
there is more than one tax instrument. Generally, the revenue raising capacity of a local 
government is not fully realized as a result of which the revenues actually raised are far 
below those measured by the capacity. Throughout the world it has been found that cities are 
underperforming in terms of realizing their maximum revenue potential. Indian cities are no 
exception, as a result of which we find that most of the local governments are heavily 
dependent on the transfers in the form of plan and non-plan grants from higher levels of 
government.  
Maximum revenue capacity as a function of the economic activities in a jurisdiction 
can be expressed as: 
Maximum revenue capacity= 


 GCP
tttB
sharetDGCP niii
N
i
i
),...,,( 21max
1
  
  
In the above equation, GCP is gross city product, a measure of total output produced 
in the city; Di equals one if a jurisdiction is allowed to use tax of type I and zero if it is not 
allowed; timax is the maximum tax rate allowed for tax of type I; sharei is the proportion of the 
tax base (Bi) that a local government is allowed to tax; and t = {ti,...,tn} is the vector of N tax 
rates imposed by a local government (some of these may be zero). 
Maximum revenue capacity refers to an ‘ideal’ situation. So it is very difficult to 
quantify this measure in terms of numbers which can be claimed to be accurate. Identifying a 
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comprehensive urban tax base and also arriving at correct numbers for different tax rates, 
simultaneously, that can result in realizing the maximum potential for revenues of a local 
government is not an easy task as the variables involved share a complex relationship with 
each other. Also, the maximum amount of revenue extractable from the urban base is a 
function of the administrative efficiencies of local governments. So, econometric or statistical 
methods of estimations have limited scope for revenue capacity estimations22.  
The “representative tax system” (RTS) is one of the widely applied approaches to 
measuring revenue capacity. . It involves calculating the amount of revenues a jurisdiction 
would be able to raise if it imposed ‘standard’ tax rates on a given tax bases in the 
jurisdiction.  The standard tax bases include all of the taxes used by any of the jurisdictions 
within a metropolitan area or a state. The “standard” tax rates are generally taken to be the 
average rates utilized by the jurisdictions in the reference group. Fiscal (revenue) capacity is 
thus the weighted sum of N potential tax bases in a jurisdiction, where the weight for each 
base is the average tax rate, τi for tax i.  Ignoring any intergovernmental sources of revenue, 
the revenue-raising capacity of local government j can be written as: 
Rj =  ∑i   τiBASEij           
where Rj is the local government revenue-raising capacity of local governments in any given 
state and BASEij refers to local government j’s tax base for revenue source i.23 τi refers to the 
standard or the tax rate to be applied.   
In the present analysis we would follow closely the above approaches. We have 
replaced the word ‘taxes’ by ‘urban revenues’ as we take both tax and non tax components of 
revenues for the revenue capacity estimations as we find in all the UAs the non tax 
component is fairly high, particularly for the smaller fast growing ULBs. However the 
methodology is subject to certain limitations due to non availability of city level data at the 
desired level of disaggregation. 
 
22 Regression approach is used to estimate revenue capacity but for the present analysis adequate 
data is not available to carry out such procedures.  
23 In fact, we can make a further distinction here to define what is administratively feasible to be 
collected as revenues can be defined as feasible revenue capacity. This may be defined as  t..B, 
where all other terms are as defined before, and  refers to the efficiency with which the taxes are 
collected.  
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Our methodology involves two major steps. The first step would be to identify the 
urban base through which revenues can be generated. Due to non-availability of data on GCP 
for ULBs or any other reliable data on variables which can act as proxies for urban tax bases, 
we have followed a simple straightforward method for estimating the gross city products 
(GCPs). We have used per capita non agricultural component of gross district domestic 
products24 for the respective districts in which the ULBs are located25 and multiplied them by 
the population of each of the ULBs to get a proxy for the GCP of the local government 
(Figures 1 and 3, Table A 2) 26. 
Once the revenue base for measuring revenue capacity is estimated, the next task 
would be to choose an appropriate rate which can be applied to the base specified. Choosing 
a ‘standard’ rate that maximizes the revenue is very difficult because ULBs collect tax and 
non tax revenues which encompasses a lot of categories. We have taken the ratio of own 
revenue27 to the estimated GCP as a benchmark and to be consistent with the worldwide 
evidence on under-performing local governments, have applied a positive margin28 to this 
ratio to estimate the ‘standard’ rate (Table 11). These rates are multiplied with the GCPs to 
get the maximum own revenue capacity figures. The existing levels of transfers29 for each 
 
24 Published by Central Statistical Organisation. 
25 See Table 1 for the details of the Districts in which the ULBs are situated 
26 This implies that the per capita domestic product across municipalities of a district is the same, but 
with the data constraint this is the best way to construct a proxy for GCP at the municipality level in 
India. The rationale for using the non-agricultural component is that possibility of pursuing agricultural 
activities in the urban areas is minimal.   
27 For Pune we have not taken the actual own revenues but have estimated the own revenues without 
octroi taking into consideration the possibility of abolition of octroi in near future. For this we have 
deducted the octroi component of own revenues from actual own revenues and taken the ratio of own 
revenues without octroi to GCP.  
28 It is to be noted that for each UA the median value of the ratio of own revenue to GCP of all ULBs is 
taken as the benchmark rate. The margins added to this rate vary across UAs. The margins are 
decided on the basis of the growth rate of own revenues in the ULBs of a UA in the past five years, 
the disparity in the own revenue to GCP ratios amongst the ULBs in the UA and political feasibility. 
29  For Pune we have estimated the transfers component in the absence of octroi by adding an 
estimated compensation from the higher government with abolition of octroi. The compensation is 
generally given as a percentage (varying between 5-10% for previous cases of abolition of octroi in 
India) of the average of the past three years octroi collection in the city. We have estimated the 
compensation with 7.5% in case of Pune.    
ULB is added to the estimated own revenue capacity to get the revenue capacity numbers for 
a ULB (Figures 2 and 4, Table A 2). 
Table 11 Ratio of Own revenue to Gross City products of UAs 
       Source: Authors’ Computations 
Urban Agglomeration Ratio of Own Revenue to GCP    (Median for all ULBs) 
 ‘Standard’ Rate of Maximum Own 
Revenue Capacity to GCP 
Hyderabad 2.7% 3.25% 
Chennai 1.7% 2.5% 
Kolkata 1.15% 2.5% 
Delhi 1.4% 2.25% 
Pune 1.5% 3% 
Figure 1 Estimated Gross City Products (Rs, 2004-05) 
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Figure 2 Estimated Revenue Capacities of Five UAs in India  
(Rs, 2004-05) 
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 Figure 3 Estimated Gross City Products and Revenue Capacities (Per Capita) of Five 
UAs in India (Rs, 2004-05) 
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 An analysis of these estimated GCPs and revenue capacities (Figures 1, 2, 3 and Table 
A 2) suggests 
 Among the UAs, for central cities GCP in absolute terms is the highest in 
Delhi and lowest in Hyderabad; for non central cities the highest GCP is 
recorded for Chennai and the lowest for Kolkata. In per capita terms, among 
both central and non central cities, Pune records the highest value. For the 
central cities the lowest is recorded in Hyderabad and for non central cities in 
Kolkata. 
 The highest revenue capacity in absolute terms is recorded in the central city 
of Delhi and the lowest recorded in Hyderabad whereas for non central cities 
the highest is recorded in Hyderabad and the lowest in Kolkata. In per capita 
terms the highest for both the central city and non central cities are recorded in 
Pune and the lowest in Chennai whereas for the non central cities the lowest is 
recorded in Kolkata. 
 GCPs, both in absolute and per capita terms, for the central cities in all the 
UAs are much higher than those in the non central cities (median value of non 
central cities are considered). In fact in all the UAs the GCP of the central city 
is even higher than the maximum GCP of the respective non central city. This 
is true for the absolute levels of revenue capacities also. 
 In per capita terms except for Pune in which the per capita GCP across the 
ULBs are the same because all the ULBs are located in the same district, the 
per capita GCPs in the central cities are higher than those of the non central 
cities, the difference being the least in Chennai.  
 The per capita revenue capacities in the central cities are in general higher 
than the median values of those in the non central cities of a UA with the 
exception in Pune where per capita revenue capacity in the central city is 
lower than the median value of the revenue capacity in non central cities. In 
Hyderabad, some of the smaller ULBs record higher per capita revenue 
capacities than the central city, so the maximum per capita revenue capacity in 
the non central city is higher than the central city.  
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6. An Assessment of Fiscal Health of the Selected Cities 
 This section brings together the revenue and expenditure aspects of finances to 
assess the conditions of fiscal health in the ULBs in the selected UAs. We would 
estimate the conventional need capacity or fiscal gap as the difference between the 
estimated expenditure need and revenue capacity of each ULB. We would also consider 
two measures for a ULB, one in absolute and another in relative terms, to quantify the 
gains in terms of revenues if revenue capacities are realized. The difference between the 
per capita revenue capacity and per capita actual revenue for a ULB would measure the 
per capita gain in revenues once the revenue capacity is realized. The proportion of 
revenue capacity to actual revenue would measure the percentage increase in revenues 
once the revenue capacity is realized.30 
 The estimates of fiscal gaps derived in the present analysis (in per capita terms in 
2004-05 prices) reveal (Figure 4, Table A 3) 
 All the UAs except Hyderabad both for central and non central cities record 
positive fiscal gaps which means even if the revenue capacities are realized 
the expenditure needs of the cities cannot be covered. This implies that they 
have to rely more on intergovernmental transfers even if their revenue 
potentials are realized. 
 Central cities have higher fiscal gaps than the non central cities for Hyderabad 
and Pune but for Chennai it is the other way round. All the non central ULBs 
in Hyderabad except one have recorded negative fiscal gaps. 
 For central cities fiscal gap in per capita terms ranges from Rs. 156 in 
Hyderabad (which is negative indicating to a surplus of revenue capacity over 
expenditure needs) to Rs. 1137 (positive) in Pune while for non central cities 
the median ranges from Rs.232 (negative) in Hyderabad to Rs. 1066 
(positive) in Pune with considerable variation in the non central cities in a 
UA.  
 
30 In Figure 4 and Table A 3 they are expressed in percentages. For instance for Central cities in 
Pune the ratio is 196% which means there is a potential increase in revenue  by 96% if revenue 
capacity is fully utilised. 
 Hyderabad as a UA performs the best as it records lowest and negative fiscal 
gaps both for central and non central cities whereas Pune records the highest 
positive gaps both for central and non central cities.  The performance of 
Delhi central city is next to Hyderabad in terms of the magnitude of the gap, 
followed by Chennai. For the non central cities, Chennai ranks next to 
Hyderabad followed by Kolkata.   
 
Figure 4 Indicators of Fiscal Health of Five UAs in 
India
     
  
The analysis of the other related indicators mentioned above to get an idea about the 
potential gains in revenues across the UAs suggest the following: 
 The potential gain, both in absolute per capita terms and relative proportionate 
increase, are more in central cities than in non central cities in Pune and Hyderabad 
but for Chennai it is just the reverse. 
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  Pune as a UA, both for central and non central cities, gain the most in absolute per 
capita terms and relative proportionate increases if the revenue capacities are 
realized. For central cities there is a gain of Rs 1317 per capita which amounts to 
96% increase in their revenues whereas for non central cities the respective 
medians are Rs.792 and 55%. 
 For the central cities Hyderabad ranks next to Pune followed by Delhi and 
Chennai, both for the absolute per capita and proportionate increases in revenues, 
the lowest figures for Chennai being Rs 225 and 19%.For non central cities 
Kolkata records the lowest in terms of absolute per capita increases in revenue (Rs 
82) and Hyderabad records the lowest in terms of proportionate increases (13%).    
 
7. Conclusions: Data Caveats and Limitations 
The above analysis gives a broad overview of fiscal health of five major urban 
agglomerations in India.  Analyzing expenditures and revenues in detail for the financial year 
2004-05, in a diverse sample of five big corporations and sixty three smaller ULBs dispersed 
in 13 districts in five major states, we find that apart from only five smaller ULBs in 
Hyderabad (with population in the range of (0.1-0.3) million, the other ULBs are not in a 
position to cover their expenditure needs by their present revenue collections. Our sample of 
UAs consists of the fastest growing and the most lucrative destinations for investments. The 
existing state of affairs in city level finances in these cities indicates that in the relatively less 
competent cities, the situation would be worse.   
It is surprising that with the exception of one UA, i.e., Hyderabad, all the others 
would fail to cover their expenditure needs, even if they realize their revenue potentials. As a 
result, they would require higher levels of intergovernmental transfers. This would create 
pressure on the higher tiers of the government for financing city development. In all the UAs, 
except Chennai, bigger corporations are more constrained than their smaller counterparts.  
We do not find concrete evidence to justify the role of parastatal agencies in sharing 
the burden of responsibilities with the ULBs. Though in Hyderabad the HMWSSB functions 
to share the responsibilities, we cannot attribute the positive outcomes in Hyderabad to its 
efficiency because the entire responsibility for water supply and sewerage is not borne by the 
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Board but the ULBs have a fair share of it. However, we find that the absence of a parastatal 
agency overburdens the ULB which is reflected in their increased expenditure needs on 
services.  
Our estimates suffer from certain limitations which need to be mentioned. These 
limitations can mostly be attributable to non availability of data at the required level of 
disaggregation.  First, our expenditure needs estimate has a large ‘other expenditure’ 
component which arises due to non availability of disaggregated expenditure data.  This 
comprises a variety of services which the ULBs provide. Also, given the nature of these 
expenditures, it is difficult to define norms for these services, both for physical levels and 
financial expenditures. In India, norms for these services are not available. In the absence of 
norms on these services, we have taken into account the recent trends in these expenditures 
from the ULB budgets to estimate this component. 
Second, unfortunately, norms for various services are not available at the ULB level.   
Physical norms cannot be used for the reasons explained earlier. Most studies apply the 
Zakaria Committee expenditure norms adjusted to prices.  It must be noted that these norms 
were designed in the sixties and therefore, mere adjustments to price levels in the following 
years do not take into account changes in preferences of public services as well as 
technological differences over the past few decades. The norms should be designed 
considering the changes in the lifestyle of people and newer technological and engineering 
innovations in the process of service provision in the cities.  Efforts have been taken to use 
the most recent norms available but whether these financial norms reflect the true needs of 
urban society is a question.  
Third, the revenue capacity estimates implicitly assumes the per capita GCP of a ULB 
to be the same as the per capita non agricultural component of District Domestic Product of 
the district in which the ULB is situated. In fact the absolute GCP figures are derived from 
the per capita figures which make them directly proportional to the population of the ULBs. 
Fourth, the study would have been more complete if the outcomes in terms of 
finances of the cities could be related to the levels of service delivery. Unfortunately, none of 
the ULBs have a systematic record on the levels of services provided. In the absence of data 
on the levels of services for each ULB we cannot use the physical norms to assess the 
conditions but have to rely entirely on financial norms. Comparing the expenditures on each 
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service with these financial norms can be misleading as expenditures per se do not mean 
much because higher expenditures can be due to inefficiency or leakage in the system. 
Whether the resources are getting properly utilized can only be confirmed through qualitative 
and quantitative indicators of services which are not available at the ULB level. 
In spite of these shortcomings, the analysis is useful in making an overall idea about 
the fiscal health of the five UAs in India.  Surely, there are considerable unmet needs.  The 
cities are expected to be centers of economic transformation and this is possible only when 
the UAs are provided with adequate resources to provide reasonable levels of services.  This 
can be done either by vesting larger tax powers to these UAs or through intergovernmental 
transfers.   
There can be four different ways through which the revenues of UAs can be 
augmented to enable them to provide the services they are entrusted with.  First is the better 
utilization of their ’own revenue’ handles.  Our analysis shows that there is considerable 
scope for enhancing revenues by better administration of the property taxes, better 
implementation of other taxes, and better collection of user charges.  Second, the state 
governments should allow the local bodies to piggyback a small proportion on their VAT 
collections.  Gujarat has decided to levy such a tax at one percent and this will go a long way 
in augmenting the resources of the UAs.  Third, the state governments should earmark a 
portion of the sales proceeds from land and housing sold through their development agencies 
for the improvement in the infrastructure of the cities.  Finally, the State Finance Commission 
should develop proper norms for estimating expenditure needs based on which, transfers 
from the state to local governments should be recommended.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 
Figure A 1 Composition of Revenues: Delhi (Central City) 
 
Figure A 2 Composition of Revenues: Hyderabad (Central City) 
 
Figure A 3 Composition of Revenues: Hyderabad (Smaller ULBs) 
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Figure A 4 Composition of Revenues: Chennai (Central City) 
 
 
Figure A 5 Composition of Revenues: Chennai (Smaller ULBs) 
 
Figure A 6 Composition of Revenues: Kolkata (Smaller ULBs) 
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Figure A 7 Composition of Own Revenues: Pune (Central City) 
[Without Octroi Scenario] 
 
 
Figure A 8  Composition of Revenues: Pune (Smaller ULBs) 
[Without Octroi Scenario] 
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Table A 1 Per Capita Expenditure Norms (O&M, Rs, 2004-05) 31 
 Water Supply Sewerage Solid Waste 
Management 
Roads Street Lights UA 
Central 
City 
Non Central 
City  
Median 
(Maximum, 
Minimum)  
Central 
City 
Non Central City 
Median 
(Maximum, 
Minimum)  
Central City Non Central 
City  
Median 
(Maximum, 
Minimum)  
Central 
City 
Non Central 
City  
Median 
(Maximum, 
Minimum)  
Central 
City 
Non Central 
City  
Median 
(Maximum, 
Minimum)  
Delhi 140    39   348   84   60  
Chennai 140 
 
258
(258, 258)32 
39
 
65
(65,      65) 
348
 
255
(255 ,225) 
53
 
33
(33 , 30) 
75
 
63
  (63, 59) 
Hyderabad 140 
 
258
(258, 258) 
39  65
(65, 65) 
348  255
(255, 255) 
50  28
(28, 28) 
70  54
(54,     54) 
Kolkata   218
(218, 198) 
  139
(139, 65) 
  285
(285, 225) 
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                    Source: National Institute of Urban Affairs, 1995; Pricewaterhouse Coop 001),  Authors’ computations  ers (2
  33   5
     (33,27) 
5
(55, 47 ) 
Pune 140 
 
258
(316, 258) 
 
39 
 
47
  (47 , 37) 
 
348 
 
255
(285  ,  
225) 
59 
 
32
(32 ,  30) 
 
62 
 
47
(47,     44) 
 
 
31 For street lights and roads taken from Pricewaterhouse Coopers (2001) are converted to 2004-05 prices from2000-2001 prices in which they are expressed in the original 
report.   
32 The financial norms are calculated according to  city size; wherever all the smaller ULBs belong to the same size class, the maximum and minimum expenditure norms in  
per capita terms are the same.  
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Table A 2 Estimated Gross City Products (GCPs) and Revenue Capacities of Five UAs in India (Rs, 2004-05) 
Gross City Products Gross City Products 
(Per Capita) 
Revenuer Capacity Revenuer Capacity 
(Per Capita) 
UA 
Central  
City 
Non Central City  
Median, (Maximum, 
Minimum)  
Central City Non Central City  
Median, (Maximum, 
Minimum)  
Central  
City 
0Non Central 
City  
Median, 
(Maximum, 
Minimum)  
Central  
City 
Non Central 
City  
Median, 
(Maximum, 
Minimum)  
Delhi 882,349,992,046  58,353  26,907,120,821  1,779  
Chennai 
175,799,332,496 
 
7,932,475,550 
(12,107,497,067 , 
3,023,600,299) 
39,008 
 
34,875 
(34,875, 26,320 ) 
 
6,382,483,312 
 
203,539,522 
(334,725,427 , 
88,632,007) 
1,416 
 
895 
(1,241, 713) 
 
Hyderabad 
146,955,034,547 
 
5,572,729,053 
(9,530,626,621, 
2,989,546,788) 
37,712 
 
28,517 
(28,517, 28,517) 
 
5,996,619,623 
 
228,008,891 
(375,869,365, 
123,890,416) 
1,539 
 
 
1,133 
(1,588, 927) 
Kolkata 214,380,616,686 
2,646,339,495 
(7,547,629,797, 
839,657,428) 
46,241 
18,020 
(23,925, 16,480) 
 
 
73,105,265 
(223,890,634, 
25,595,231) 
1,133 
 
544 
(802 ,384) 
Pune 
238,821,207,235 
 
6,371,275,586 
(100,820,791,973, 
3,990,105,419) 
81,399 
 
81,399 
(81,399, 81,399) 
 
7,879,994,653 
 
218,088,315 
(3,393,975,461, 
128,205,629) 
2,686 
 
2,748 
(2,816, 2,615) 
 
               Source: Authors’ Computations
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Table A 3 Indicators of Fiscal Health of Five UAs in India  
Difference In Per Capita 
Revenue Capacity And Per 
Capita Actual Revenue 
(Rs, 2004-05) 
Ratio Of Revenue Capacity 
To Total Revenue  
(%) 
Per Capita Fiscal Gap 
(Rs, 2004-05) 
UA 
Central 
City 
Non Central City 
Median  
(Maximum, 
Minimum) 
Central 
City 
Non Central City 
Median 
(Maximum, 
Minimum) 
Central 
City 
Non Central City 
Median 
(Maximum, 
Minimum) 
Delhi 491  138%  74  
Chennai 225 
 
300 
(403,  225) 
119% 
 
132% 
(188%, 158%) 
96 
 
244 
(3,841, -168) 
Hyderabad 679 
 
116 
(343, 29) 
179% 
 
113% 
(143%, 103%) 
-156 
 
-232 
(368, -1,048) 
Kolkata  82 
(347, 29) 
 118% 
(277%, 108%) 
 442 
(606, 37) 
Pune 1,317 
 
792 
(1,789, 289) 
196% 
 
155% 
(288%, 111%) 
1,137 
 
1,066 
(1,182, 995) 
Source: Authors’ Computations 
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